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RECENT STATUTES
HOTEL KEEPER'S LTABiLrTY-PoPERTY IN TRANsPRT.-Chapter 741 of the Iaws
of 1937, amending Section 203 of the General Business Law, gives hotel keepers a
method of limiting their common law liability for the loss of or injury to property
of guests which had been delivered to them for conveyance to or from their hotels.'
This new statute was enacted to terminate the injustice of a guest receiving huge
sums2 for baggage lost in transport, where the innkeeper, who undertook the carriage
was given no notice of such extraordinary value. There had been a fertile field for
fraud by dishonest guests. Now, the legislature has supplied a needed remedy by pro-
nouncing that no hotel keeper is liable for more than $250. for damage to such goods,
unless at the time of their delivery to the keeper their value in excess of $250. is
declared and a written receipt for that amount is issued by the innkeeper. Not only
are the opportunities for fraud lessened, but the innkeeper, having notice of the
value of goods received, is in a better position to give more adequate care to ex-
pensive property. Even after issuance of such an acknowledgement of value re-
ceived, the hotel keeper is not liable beyond $500, unless the damage was caused
through his fault or negligence. 3
The common law was hardly munificent when it granted an innkeeper a lien4 on
the goods of his guest, for it simultaneously exacted from him the extraordinary
liability of an insurer5 for the safety of these goods.0 This liability extended only
1. N. Y. Ga-. Bus. LAw, § 203-a. Hotel keeper's liability for Property in trarnport.
No hotel keeper shall be liable in any sum exceeding the sum of two hundred and fifty
dollars for the loss of or damage to property of a guest delivered to such keeplr, his
agent or employee, for transport to or from the hotel, unless at the time of delivering
the same such value in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars -hall be stated by such
guest and a written receipt stating such value shall be issued by such keeper; provided,
however, that where such written receipt is issued the keeper shall not be liable beyond
five hundred dollars unless it Shall appear that such loss or damage occurred through his
fault or negligence.
§ 203-b. Posting of statute. Every keeper of a hotel or inn shall post in a public
and conspicuous place and manner in the registration office and in the public rooms
of such hotel or inn a printed copy of this section and section two hundred three-a.
§ 2. This act shall take effect immediately.
2. In the recent case of Davidson v. Madison Corp., 257 N. Y. 120, 177 N. E. 393
(1931), plaintiff recovered the sum of $10,000 where the hotel had been given no previous
knowledge of the value of the baggage.
3. This statute continues the close parallel between the liability of the innkeeper and
the common carrier. A provision similar to that contained in this new law is found in the
N. Y. Public Service Commission Law § 38 relating to common carriers, baggage com-
panies, and transfer companies.
4. Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 106 App. Div. 431, 94 N. Y. Supp. 702 (1st Dep't 1905);
Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 106 Eng. Reprints 667 (1820). The lien extended
to goods not owned by the guest but lawfully in his possession, even where the inn-
keeper had notice of this lack of ownership by the guest. Robins & Co. v. Gray, 2 Q. B.
501 (1895). It did not extend to goods which the host knew to be in the unlawful
possession of the guest. Johnson v. HIll, 3 Stark 172, 171 Eng. Reprints 812 (1822);
BEALE, INNE=Eas Am HorEs (1906) § 262. It seems that the lien attached itself even
to goods stolen by a guest provided the fact of illegal possession was unknown to the
host. See Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulst. 269, 271, 81 Eng. Reprints 227, 228 (1895).
5. Unless injury arose from the negligence or misconduct of the guest, an act of God,
or the public enemies, no degree of diligence could absolve the innkeeper. Hulett v. Swift,
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to property infra 1:ospitium,7 but the confines of the hospithim were not the physical
bounds of the hotel. Thus, even though goods were outside the limits of the hostelry,
if they had been entrusted to the personal custody of the keeper, they were regarded
as infra hospitiumn and fully covered by the liability.8
In early days when the law concerning innkeepers was taking its initial form,
travelers carried few effects and experienced no difficulty in personally conveying
them directly to the hotel. The development of transportation facilities, with their
increased spatial capacities, permitted the carriage of more cumbersome baggage,
and it became difficult for the traveler personally to carry this to the inn. As
hotels undertook this service, which involved the acquisition of custody of goods
before their owner had become a guest, courts were confronted with the question
whether the. innkeeper's special liability extended to them during the course of
their transport and before the establishment of the host-guest relationship. With
little hesitancy, however, many courts declared that where a person, intending to
become a guest at a hotel, turns over his baggage to the proprietor or his servant
at a railroad depot, and within a reasonable time does become a guest, the inn-
keeper's extraordinary liability attaches the moment he assumes custody of the
goods. 9 Even the delivery of a mere baggage check to the innkeeper has been held
to be a sufficient constructive delivery of the baggage, and to make the host answer-
able for the safe return of the check itself or of the baggage it represents.10 These
33 N. Y. 571, 88 Am. Dec. 405 (1865). Accidental fire was not an act of God unless
produced by lightning or other irresistible human cause. Fay v. Pacific Imp. Co., 93
Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099 (1891); Miller v. Steam Navigation Company, 10 N. Y. 431 (1853).
A minority holds the innkeeper immune from liability in the absence of negligence. John-
son v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 302, 63 Am. Dec. 369 (1855); Hill v. Owen, 5 Blackf. 323, 35
Am. Dec. 124 (Ind. 1840).
6. The general rule is that the innkeeper's liability is not confined to goods of any
particular kind. Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 (Mass. 1851); Van Wyck
v. Howard, 12 How. Pr. 147 (N. Y. 1856); Cayle's Case, 8 Coke 32-a, 77 Eng. Reprints
520 (1584); ScHour'LE, BAm1L NTS AND C auums (3rd ed. 1897) § 283. However, in at
least one American jurisdiction, Maryland, the innkeeper is liable only for articles ordi-
narily used on a journey. Pettigrew v. Barnum, 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. Dec. 212 (1857)
(host not liable for silver, knives, forks, and spoons); Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 126
(1859) (surgical instruments not baggage for which the innkeeper is liable, unless guest
is connected with the medical profession).
7. Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282 (N. Y. 1839); " .... for the thing with which
the hostler shall be charged ought to be iira hospitium!' Cayle's Case, 8 Coke 32-a,
77 Eng. Reprints 520 (1584). JoNe.s, BAMxL=xTS (4th ed. 1833) 92.
8. Cohen v. Manuel, 91 Me. 274, 39 Atl. 1030 (1898); Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend.
282 (N. Y. 1839); Jones v. Tyler, 1 Ad. & El. 522, 110 Eng. Reprints 1307 (1834).
9. Sassen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867). This case seems to be a logical and pro-
gressive development of certain earlier holdings. It was an early common law rule that
the mere acceptance of animate property by an innkeeper constituted the owner of that
property a guest, even though he had no intent to avail himself of the accommodations
of the hotel. Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, 20 Am. Dec. 471 (Mass. 1830); York v.
Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, 92 Eng. Reprints 79 (1703). Also, where at the time of
delivery there was an intent to become a guest, it seems that the innkeeper would be
immediately liable as such for the property whether animate or inanimate. See Grinnell
v. Cook, 3 Hill 485, 490, 38 Am. Dec. 663, 664 (N. Y. 1842).
10. Keith' v. Atkinson, 48 Colo. 480, 111 Pac. 55. (1910); Coskery v. Nagle, 83 Ga.
696, 10 S. E. 491 (1889).
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cases, in holding the innkeeper on common law grounds really extend his liability
to goods extra hospitium but within his personal custody, contingent only on the
consummation of the host-guest relationship.11
While New York has invoked the innkeeper's special common law liability to
hold him for goods lost in the course of removal from the hotel to a depot, 2- the
Court of Appeals, in a recent case, deliberately refrained from extending this lia-
bility to the situation where a guest at a hotel entrusted to the porter her baggage
check, and the baggage was negligently lost while being carried to the inn.13 But,
though the innkeeper as such was not held liable, he was not permitted to escape
responsibility entirely. Rather, inasmuch as a charge was made by the hotel for
this service, the court found that such loss of the goods was the negligent breach
of an implied in fact contract to convey safely, and upon this ground predicated
liability.14
The paramount objection of the court to bringing this property within the pale
of the innkeeper's special liability was that, after the baggage was released by the
railroad, the independent transfer company to whom the porter had in turn given
the check, and not the porter had been in custody of it. The hotel, through its
porter, had been in custody of the baggage check, but the court is not "greatly
impressed" with the reasoning of those cases which hold the delivery of a check
as a symbolical delivery of the baggage.15
Exactly what constitutes a "delivery" of such goods is of particular importance
in view of the requirement of this new statute that it shall operate only upon cases
where goods are "delivered" to the innkeeper for transport "to or from the hotel".'0
Delivery fixes the liability, and fixing a liability must be anterior to the application
11. Where man entrusted baggage to porter, but never became a guest, held, the hotel
is not liable either as innkeeper or bailee, though porter is personally liable as bailee.
Tulane Hotel Co. v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214, 79 S. W. 113 (1904).
12. Maxwell v. Gerard, 84 Hun. 537, 32 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1895), holding that where
an innkeeper undertakes to deliver the goods of a departing guest to a depot he is liable
as innkeeper until so delivered.
13. Davidson v. Madison Corp., 257 N. Y. 120, 177 N. E. 393 (1931).
14. Although the trunk was lost through the negligence of an independent contractor
to whom the transfer had been assigned by the porter, the court finds no difficulty in
holding the hotel on the ground that when a contract duty is assgned, the original obligor
cannot escape liability for negligent non-performance by its 'agnee.
Quacre: Would the innkeeper be liable in the absence of negligence? The case of David-
son v. Madison Corporation does not settle this point.
15. Inferentially, the Court of Appeals would seem disposed to hold the innkeeper
as such where the baggage was actually delivered. Davidson v. Madison Corp., 257 N. Y.
120, 123, 177 N. E. 393, 394 (1931). In this very case, the Appellate Division had al-
lowed recovery on the theory that the hotel was liable as innheeper, and that the delivery
of the baggage check was sufficient constructive delivery of the baggage. Davidson v.
Madison Corp., 231 App. Div. 421, 247 N. Y. Supp. 789 (1st Dep't 1931). The Court of
Appeals, while preferring to affirm the judgment on the ground of non-performance of
contract was careful to state: "We do not determine that the defendant was or was not
liable for the breach of a duty owed by an innkeeper to his guest," Davidson v. Madion
Corp., 257 N. Y. 120, 125, 177 N. E. 393, 394 (1931) allowing therefore for a possible
acceptance in the future of the more general view that the innkeeper is liable as such
and not on special contract grounds.
16. The statute covers "property of a guest delivered to such keeper, his agent or
employee. . .
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of a statute limiting it. It is certain that tradition even of a baggage check is suffi-
cient delivery of the baggage to fix liability where the basis is contract. 1   But
it is not decided in New York, whether any delivery, either actual or symbolical,
for transport to the hotel will evoke the application of the innkeeper's special com-
mon law liability. Moreover, even in New York, where liability is grounded ex-
clusively on contract, it would seem that the mere turning over of the baggage or
the check appears insufficient unless accompanied by a concomitant intent to become
a guest.' 8 The hotel keeper promises to convey the baggage safely, not only in
consideration for the small charge made, but especially in return for the promise
to become a guest.19
Under this statute it also becomes of importance to determine when property is
in transport. It seems obvious that baggage delivered to the innkeeper at a depot
for carriage to the hotel is in transport from the instant of delivery. But, when
property is entrusted to a host in a hotel for transport from the hotel, and the
property is lost or damaged while still within the inn, is the property in transport
or is it regarded merely as baggage in the custody of the hotel keeper? A different
liability attaches depending on the category in which this property is placed. The
terminology of the statute would appear to disclose an intent to characterize as
in transport all property delivered for transport.20
While referring to "property of a guest" the statute could hardly be construed to
be limited to property "owned" by the guest. It would rather seem to extend to
property delivered by the prospective guest to the innkeeper whether this was
owned by him or another.2 ' The law gives little protection to an innkeeper, even
where the suing party is not the owner of the goods but merely their possessor.22
17. Davidson v. Madison Corp., 257 N. Y. 120, 177 N. E. 393 (1931).
18. Transferring for a mere monetary compensation is the business of the common
carrier. The innkeeper, in transporting baggage, is performing a service as innkeeper. His
main concern is to get the patronage of the traveler, so that a promise by the traveler
to become a guest is the thing sought.
19. Whatever delivery will be demanded by the courts, the keeper shall be bound if
this is made to an employee who, even though lacking authority to accept, has been
given the appearance of authority. Keith v. Atkinson, 48 Colo. 480, 111 Pac. 55 (1910).
20. Suppose a trunk of clothing is delivered to the innkeeper for transport from the
hotel, and its value is not declared by the guest. In the event of loss through no fault
of the innkeeper, if the property is regarded as in transport, the guest would be limited
to a maximum recovery of $250.00 according to N. Y. General Business Law § 203(a);
whereas, if the property is classified as not in transport, but in the special custody of
the innkeeper, the guest is limited to a maximum recovery of $100.00, pursuant to N. Y.
General Business Law § 201.
21. With reference to property infra hospitium, it has long been said that the Inn-
keeper is liable for its loss or damage even though the guest was not the owner. See
Robins & Co. v. Gray, 2 Q. B. 506, 507 (1895). In the field of carriers, the consignor
is generally given a right of action for damage to goods in transport, even though he
was not the owner but a mere agent or bailee. Southern Ry. Co. v. Brewster, 9 Ala.
App. 597, 63 So. 790 (1913); Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 2 Ga. App. 36, 58 S. E. 333
(1907); see Litzenberg v. Cole, 166 App. Div. 134, 136, 151 N. Y. Supp. 687, 688 (1st
Dep't 1915).
22. Whether one in wrongful possession of goods could recover damages for their loss
or injury is problematical. It is vigorously argued that recovery should be denied, es-
pecially where the party causing the injury is ready to compensate the true owner.
HAIWER, LAW OF ToRTS (1933) 57, n. 55. Such a party would, it seems, be a better
custodian of the funds and should be permitted to hold them for the true owner.
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This statute does not extend to goods entrusted to the host's care pending fur-
ther instructions. If the guest continues in the capacity of guest, the innkeeper
is held accountable for the gbods according to the ordinary rules relating to property
within the in.P If the guest severs the relationship, the host's severe liability re-
mains unchanged for a reasonable time,2- after which the innkeeper holds the
goods as an ordinary bailee.2 5
To avail himself of the protection of this statute, the innkeeper must conform
to the usual provision in limiting legislation of this kind, that he post a copy of the
law in a public and conspicuous place.20 Failure to do this will remit him to the
liability borne under the common law.27 The real purport of this provision is that
the guest be informed of the contents of the law. It would seem that an actual
personal notice to a guest of the terms of the law is equivalent to the constructive
notice provided by the statute, and entitles the hotel keeper to the benefits of the
law.28
Sound policy is enunciated in this statute. It is in line with earlier enactments
reasonably curtailing the severe liability of innkeepers. Yet the residual liability
amply and fairly protects the interests of guests. The difficulties of interpretation in
such terms as "property," "delivery," and "in transport" which must await the
decision of the courts, may be readily resolved by judicial action.
HUsAN tan WIE-RGHT OF AcTIoN FOR ToRTs.-By the enactment of Chapter
669 of the Laws of 1937,1 one of the last barriers to the emancipation of a married
woman from the control of her husband was removed.2 Under the common law,
a husband could inflict bodily injuries upon his wife, or destroy her property and
yet have complete immunity against any claim on her part for redress for the in-
23. N. Y. GsENERA Businmss LAw (1923) § 200 (1924) § 201.
24. Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65, 5 Am. Rep. 524 (1870); Max:ell v. Gerard, 84 Hun
537, 32 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1S95); BEAL., Irarn Fans AND HOTELS (1906) § 234.
25. Wear v. Gleason, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. 756 (1890); Wintermute v. Clarke, 7 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 242 (1851); Hoffman v. Roessle, 39 Misc. 787, 81 N. Y. Supp. 291 (Sup.
Ct. 1902).
26. N. Y. GEEAL Busumiss LAw (1937) § 203(b). See Note 1, supra.
27. Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112 (1883). Thus, without the pro-
tection of this statute, the innkeeper would be liable for the full value of the article en-
trusted to him.
28. Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y. 111 (1860); see Herter v. Dwyer, 129 N. Y. Supp.
505, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1911). Contra: Batterson v. Vogel, 8 Mlo. App. 24, where statute
required that notice be posted in bedroom, innkeeper was denied its protection for having
failed so to post it, even though in fact the guest had received notice and had read a
copy of the law.
1. This amendment adds to the N. Y. Do. REL. LAw (1909) § 57 the following
sentence:
"A married woman has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or
tortious acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined in section thirty-aeven of
the General Construction Law, or resulting in injury to her property, as if they were
unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for a wrongful or tortious acts resulting in
any personal injury to her husband or to his property, as if they were unmarried."
2. Some restrictions necessarily remain. For example, the husband's domicile generally
determines the domicile of the wife. See Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 243, 149 N. E.
844, 845 (1925).
19371
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juries inflicted or for compensation for the property destroyed.8  Marriage at
common law merged the person and rights of a woman with her husband. They
were under his absolute control.4 The husband was liable to third parties for all
the frauds and injuries of his wife whether committed before or during coverture.
If committed under his coercion, he and he alone was liable;5 otherwise both were
liable.6 A married woman substantively had the capacity to commit most torts,
but her responsibility in a sense was suspended during coverture and the husband
was subjected. The husband and wife were one.7 In the case of torts committed
against a married woman, by a third party, her legal personality was substantially
recognized, and insofar as the tortious act caused injury to a legally recognized
person it was a chose in action of the woman's. Of course the married woman
had no capacity to sue or be sued, alone, in her own name, but must join or be
joined with her husband. And judgment was rendered in favor of the husband or
against both husband and wife.8 It also was true that she could make no contracts
on her own behalf and her promises were unenforceable against her.8
Judicial interpretation and indirect legislation has gradually eliminated this early
subjection of the married woman. Generally the incapacity which attached to the
marital state of a woman to own property, and the inability on her part to make
contracts and to sue or be sued, remained unchanged, in theory at least, until 1871,
the time of the enactment of the enabling statutes.10 The primary object of the
enabling acts was to free a married woman's property from the control of her hus-
band, and today there is no doubt that a wife can assert property rights against her
husband. 11
The controversial field has been the subject of torts affecting the person. The
enabling statutes of the various states have differed in terms and have been con-
strued in the light of what each jurisdiction chose to declare was the legislative
intent. There are some statutes which directly forbid tort actions between the
3. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909) (assault); Blickenstaff v. Bllcken-
staff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167 N. E. 146 (1929) (negligence); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,
152 Md. 247, 136 At]. 534 (1925) (negligence); Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 664 (1882)
(assault); Webster v. Webster, [1916] 1 K. B. 714 (imprisonment and malicious prosecution).
4. ScHOULER, Dom.smc RELATONS (6th ed. 1921) § 627 et seq.
5. Handy v. Foley, 121 Mass. 259, 23 Am. Rep. 270 (1876); Dohorty v. Madgett,
58 Vt. 323, 2 Atl. 115 (1885).
6. Casin v. Delany, 38 N. Y. 178 (1868); McKeown v. Johnson, 1 McCord 578, 10
Am. Dec. 698 (S. C. 1882).
7. White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 328 (1862); In re Bramberry, 156 Pa. St. 628, 27
At. 405 (1893).
8. McElfresh v. Kirkendall et a., 36 Iowa 224 (1873); Little v. Garner, S N. H.
415, 22 Am. Dec. 468 (1831); Horton v. Payne, 27 How. Pr. 374 (N. Y. 1864); Muser
v. Lewes, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 431 (1884). The only time the common law disregarded
the unity concept was in the case of crimes by one spouse against the person of the
other. See Blackbrun J. ini Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436 (1876); (1924) 37 Hv. L.
REv. 616; (1922) 20 MicH. L. REV. 547; (1922) 31 YArE L. J. 337.
9. Pillow v. Sentenelle, 49 Ark. 430, 5 S. W. 783 (1887).
10. For a complete discussion of the historical development of the law of married
women with citation of important cases see Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 63
AtI. 285 (1906).
11. For a complete account of property rights at common law see McCuRuY, CAszs oN
PERSONS AND DomFsTic RELAToNs (1927) §§ 507-519 and cases cited therein. (1930) 43
H. v. L. REv. 1030.
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husband and wife.' 2 Where, however, the statute is silent, one jurisdiction has inter-
preted the legislative intent to give a right to a married woman to sue her husband
in contract as also inclusive of the right to sue him in tort. 3 In another jurisdic-
tion upon the theory that a wrong to a person is a property right and that these
statutes gave her a separate estate in property, a married woman has been per-
mitted to maintain suits against her husband for wrongs committed against her with
the same force and effect as she is entitled to maintain any property action against
him.14 While many interpretations have been directed with the thought that the
legislative and constitutional changes were intended to strike from women the
shackles of the common law rules and to make them separate legal entities,' " at
the same time the principle of interpretation that statutes in derogation of the
common law should be strictly construed, has on many occasions defeated the intent
and purpose of emancipation by denying to the woman a right of action.' 0 Finally,
other jurisdictions claim that it is only necessary to determine whether such an
action is maintainable. The character of the parties is no longer important. T
The courts in New York under the enabling acts permitted actions at law between
spouses for property torts'8 and for trover,19 but when it came to the question of
personal torts, the courts refused to allow the action holding that a husband might
libel or slander his wife, prosecute her, assault her, or falsely imprison her without
subjection of himself to her for damages. He was not within his legal rights in thus
injuring her, the courts admitted, but the legislature had failed specifically to include
the husband in the general grant to her of the right to sue for injuries to her person.2 0
The amendment that has been enacted by the last legislature has been under
consideration by that body for some years past.2 ' With the growth of insurance
12. LA. CODE PRAC. (Dart. 1922) art. 105; N. J. Cozw. STAT. (1911) tit. 124, § 14; PA.
STAT. Azu. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, § 111.
13. Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 187 S. W. 460 (1916) (the statute does not
specifically name the husband as one who can be sued on the contract).
14. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 207 (1916).
15. Graves v. Peck, 4 Neb. 745, 209 N. W. 617 (1916) (a married woman is a separate
legal entity); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okl 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914) (the courts there
holding that the general statute, declaring that a woman shall retain the same legal
existence and legal personality after marriage as before and shall receive the same protection
of all rights as a woman, which her husband does as a man, gave her the right to sue
him for tort).
16. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1897); see, however, the aissenting opi-
nion of Harlan, J., id. at 619. In those cases which interpret the statute and deny the
wife the right to sue her husband for personal torts, a vigorous dissent from the views of
the majority almost invariably appears.
17. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 AUt. 889 (1914) (the court heldc that the right to
contract with her husband and to sue him for breach of contract or for tort, is not given
the wife by statute. These are rights which belonged to her before Marriage and are not
now lost to her by the fact of marriage although they would have been at common law);
Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915) (the legislative intent in enacting the
statute was to change the legal status of husband and wife).
18. Minier v. Mlinier, 4 Lans. 421 (N. Y. 1870) (holding a wife had a cause of action
in ejectment against her husband under the statute).
19. Berdell v. Berdell, 19 Hun 358 (N,, Y. 1871) (the court upheld an action of trover
brought by a husband against his wife).
20. See cases cited note 3, s-pra. The ground in these decisions was that statutes in
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed.
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there has been constant revelation by legislative investigations of frauds committed
against insurance carriers. The fact that giving the right to a married woman to
sue her husband for personal torts would add yet another opportunity for fraud
in the automotive field alone, had been the stumbling block that impeded the
progress of this legislation. This difficulty, however, has been met and overcome. As
part of the same chapter that confers upon the married woman the right to sue
her husband, there have been included amendments to the insurance law2 2 and the
traffic and vehicular acts23 which will accord protection to the insurance companies
against any possible collusion between husband and wife to defraud them.
The struggle to obtain a proper standing before the courts for a married woman
has been long indeed.24 It may be that in the past, the protection that is now ac-
corded to her was not as necessary as it is today, but with the growth of industrial
progress and the attendant destruction of the social barriers and distinctions of
other days, it has become necessary that the person of a married woman be held
sacred before the courts. The instant statute is in accord with the established trend.
RIGHTS AND LIABILTIEs o UNDIsCLosED PRINCIPAL-SEALED INSTRUMENT-Within
recent years, the rule as to the rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal upon
an instrument under seal has become the target of juristic1 and statutory2 attack. By
amendment,3 New York has now abrogated the common law rule that an un-
21. First introduced in 1929 in the New York State Assembly by Abbott Low Moffat,
present Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.
22. Chapter 669 of the Laws of 1937, adding Subdivision 3a of § 109 of the Insur-
ance Law. It provides that policies must be extended in writing to include the insured's
family, before courts will allow recovery on the basis of the new right granted the wife.
It was intended that this subdivision should be construed entirely independently of any
other section of the Insurance Law. The amendment of § 57, extending the right of
action by a married woman against her husband, added a new liability which, at least,
insofar as tort actions are concerned was not covered by any insurance policy in force
before the time of the amendment since such right of action did not exist. When the
legislation provided the right of action it was felt essential not to extend coverage of
policies beyond that which was intended when written.
23. Chapter 669 of the Laws of 1937, amending § 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
24. For a complete discussion of reasons for opposing this amendment see Comment
(1935) 4 FoaRDrHA L. REv. 475-478.
1. Lagumis v. Gerard, 116 Misc. 471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1921); see
Harris v. Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343, 348, 349, 130 N. E. 572, 573, 574 (1921); Gaynor, J,,
dissenting in Stanton v. Granger, 125 App. Div. 174, 179, 109 N. Y. Supp. 134, 138
(2d Dep't 1908); CARDozo, THE NATURE oF m JuDIcIA, PRocEss (1925) 15; Crane,
The Magic of the Private Seal (1915) 15 CoL. L. REv. 24; Comment (1936) 5 FonRDnAM.
L. REv. 144, 148.
2. MD. ANN. CoDE (Bagby, 1924) art. 75, § 15; N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT (1937) § 342,
subdiv. 2.
3. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1937) § 342 reads:
"1. A seal upon a written instrument hereafter executed shall not be received as con-
clusive or presumptive evidence of consideration. A written instrument, hereafter exe-
cuted, which changes or modifies or which discharges in whole or in part a scaled instru-
ment shall not be deemed invalid or ineffectual because of the absence of a seal thereon,
A sealed instrument may not be changed, modified, or discharged by an executory agree-
ment unless such agreement is in writing and 'signed by the party against whom It is
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disclosed principal can neither sue nor be sued upon a sealed writing.4 The purpose
of such legislation is the elimination of the inequalities resulting from this unjust and
anomalous doctrine.
Previously, the law on this point had been unsettled. Relying on the dicta in
Briggs v. Partridges and in Harris v. ShorallO courts of equity disregarded the presence
of the seal and granted specific performance for and against the undisclosed principal 7
In several instancess recovery was permitted against the undisclosed principal in
simple contract by declaring that the use of the seal on the instrument was superfluous
and not essential to the validity of the agreement. But despite extra-judicial utterances
to the contrary,9 the Court of Appeals in Crowley v. Lewis'o expressly held that a con-
tract under seal may not be enforced by or against persons who are not parties to the
agreement whether the seal is surplusage or not, and further, that this common law
doctrine was subject to change only by legislative fiat. But the court intimated that
the undisclosed principal might be held liable in quasi-contract where he has received
the benefits of the agreement.11 This dictum later met with disapproval 2 on the
ground that to permit such action would be a circumvention of the established rule. But
this rule is now changed by the amendments abolishing the distinction between sealed
and unsealed instruments as to the rights and liabilities of the undisclosed principal.
sought to enforce the change, modification or discharge. A sealed instrument so changed
or modified shall continue to be construed as an instrument under seal.
"2. Subject to the provisions of subdivision one hereof, and to the provisions of section
forty-seven of the civil practice act, the rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal
under any sealed instrument hereafter executed shall be the same as if the instrument had
not been sealed."
'4. C. F. Starita Co., Inc. v. Compagnie Havraise Peninsulaire, 52 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 123 Ga. 686, 51 S. E. 58Z (190S); Case v. Case,
203 N. Y. 263, 96 N. E. 440 (1911); Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374
(1925); 2 Acn= , AGrcuc (2d ed. 1914) 1734; RESTATE LENT, AGmzcr (1933) §§ 191, 303a.
5. 64 N. Y. 357, 364 (1876).
6. 230 N. Y. 343, 348-9, 130 N. E. 572, 573-4 (1921).
7. Lagumis v. Gerard, 116 Misc. 471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (specific
performance granted in favor of the undisclosed principal); Van Ingen v. Belmont, 121
Misc. 109, 200 N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (specific performance granted against
the undisclosed principal); Diamond v. Talbot 123 Misc. 339, 205 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1924) (specific performance granted against the undisclosed principal); cf. Klein
v. Mechanics & Traders Bk., 145 App. Div. 615, 130 N. Y. Supp. 436 (2d. Dep't 1911)
(no relief in equity because the sealed contract was made to evade the law).
8. Campbell v. Poland Spring Co., 196 App. Div. 331, 187 N. Y. Supp. 643 (1st
Dep't 1921) (action on a lease under seal); Ressler v. Samphimoor Holding Corp., 201
App. Div. 344, 194 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Ist Dep't 1922) (action for rescizsion against
dummy corporation); cf. O'Grady v. Howe & Rogers Co., 166 App. Div. 5S2, 152 N. Y.
Supp. 79 (4th Dep't 1915) (the contract was not under seal although the preliminary
option was under seal).
9. CmAozo, loc. cit. supra note 1; Crane, supra note 1.
10. 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925) (action for specific performance).
11. See 239 N. Y. 264, 265, 146 N. E. 374 (1925); cf. Klein v. Mechanics &
Traders Bk., 145 App. Div. 615, 130 N. Y. Supp. 436 (2d Dept 1911) (no action lies
against the undisclosed principal for benefits conferred).
12. Owners' Holding Corp. v. Kissling, 128 Misc. 14, 217 N. Y. Supp. 189 (Sup. Ct.
1926). It would seem that the court failed to distinguish between a suit on a sealed
instrument and one in quasi-contract.
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The effects of such revision would seem to be: (1) that an action may be brought by
or against the undisclosed principal; (2) that parole evidence is admissible in order
to determine the identity of the principal; and (3) that the controverted view as to
the right of action in quasi-contract against the undisclosed principal becomes un-
important, since he can now be held liable directly on the contract.
In jurisdictions where the common law still prevails,13 a dissatisfied judiciary has
permitted recovery for and against the undisclosed principal by disregarding the seal14
or by allowing suit to be brought in quasi-contract. 0 In some states10 statutes have
been enacted declaring that the distinction between sealed and unsealed writings are
abolished and that the addition of a seal shall not affect the character or validity of
the instrument, and thus an action on the contract may be brought.17 Maryland, by
statute,18 merely stated that any person entitled to sue or be sued upon a sealed
instrument shall have such right notwithstanding the presence of the seal.
By amendment to Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act, the New York statute
declared that the rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal under any sealed
instrument shall be the same as if the instrument had not been sealed.10 But this
13. Badger Silver Mining Co. v. Drake, 88 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. Sth, 1898); Gibson v.
'Victor Talking Machine Co., 232 Fed. 225 (D. C. N. J. 1916) (parole evidence is In-
admissible when the contract is under seal); Lenney v. Finley, 118 Ga. 718, 45 S. B.
593 (1903); Walsh v. Murphy, 167 I1. 228, 47 N. E. 354 (1897); Seretto v. Schell, 247
Mass. 173, 141 N. E. 871 (1923) (action for specific performance); Borcherling v. Katz,
37 N. J. Eq. 150 (1883) (action in equity on sealed lease).
14. Crane v. U. S., 55 F. (2d) 734 (1932) (action on bond under seal executed in
N. Y. where the common law prevailed); Lancaster v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 153 Pa.
427, 26 Atl. 253 (1893) (case decided before the passage of the statute modifying the
'use of the seal); Harris v. McKay, 138 Va. 448, 122 S. E. 137 (1924); Kirschbon v.
'Bonzel, 67 Wis. 178, 29 N. W. 907 (1886).
15. Donner v. Whitecotton, 201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378 (1919) (although a
statute had abolished the use of the seal, the court held that an undisclosed principal
could not be held liable on the deed, but an action could be brought in quasi-contract);
.cf. Ottman v. Nixon-Nirdlinger, 301 Pa. 234, 151 Atl. 879 (1930).
WmLIsTox, CoNraAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) § 297 criticizes this.view on the ground that
it is difficult to find also an informal contract upon which to hold the undisclosed prin-
cipal liable when there is only the formal sealed agreement of the agent. But where
the undisclosed principal has received the benefits of the agreement through his agent,
why not impose liability upon him under the theory of unjust enrichment?
16. For a full compilation of statutes see 1 WLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 15, at
§ 218 n.
17. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934); Streeter
Jr. Co. v. Janu, 90 Minn. 393, 96 N. W. 1128 (1903) (parole evidence is admissible);
Efta v. Swanson, 115 Minn. 373, 132 N. W. 335 (1911) (the undisclosed principal was
held liable for breach of covenants in deed); Montgomery v. Dresher, 90 Neb. 632, 134
N. W. 251 (1912); McLeod v. Morrison, 66 Wash. 683, 120 Pac. 528 (1912) (action for
spedfic performance). Contra: Ladwig v. Dean, 120 Kan. 636, 284 Pac. 369 (1930)
(no action can be maintained against the undisclosed principal); Sanger v. Warren, 91
Tex. 472, 44 S. W. 477 (1898) (although statute abolished the use of the seal, common
law relating to the undisclosed principal still prevails). But see Donner v. Whitecotton,
201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378 (1919).
18. MD. ANN. CoDE (Bagby, 1924) art. 75, § 15; cf. Wyzo. Rav. STAT. (Courtrlght,
1931) §§ 97-122, stating that the use of the seal has been abolished, and further that
there shall be no difference in evidence between sealed and unsealed writings.
19. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1936) § 342, subdiv. 2.
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legislative enactment presented two difficulties: (1) Could the undisclosed principal
enforce an oral executory modification of a sealed instrument? and (2) Was the un-
disclosed principal subject to the six-year statute of limitations relating to simple
contracts rather than to the twenty-year statute relating to specialties? In order to
clarify these ambiguities, subdivision 2 of Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act was
amended2o making it subject to the already existing provisions regarding the modifica-
tion of sealed instruments2 ' and to the provisions of Section 47 of the Civil Practice
Act.2 2 Thus, one remaining effect of the seal is that an action may be brought by or
against the undisclosed principal within twenty years. But other difficulties may still
remain: for example, will an agent require authority under seal to execute sealed instru-
ments? It seems that since this is a specific statute in derogation of the common
law, it should be strictly construed and not held to affect the rules as to the principal-
agent relationship, requiring such authority to be under seal.a Probably, if such
change is to be brought about, it should be accomplished by precise legislative
amendment, after proper consideration by the Law Revision Commission.
The question remains: May the parties desiring to do so still escape the effect of
the terms of the statute rendering the undisclosed principal liable? In situations where
it is desirable to limit liability,2 4 several methods may still be used to permit an
individual to escape personal liability. The principal can choose the more expensive
method of personal incorporation or, he may still escape liability by the use of a
negotiable instrument 25 issued by and bearing only the name of his agent. The sug-
gestion26 has also been made that a carefully worded clause may be included in
the contract limiting liability to those signing the agreement and stating that the
statutory rule rendering the undisclosed principal liable does not apply. Nevertheless,
it is submitted that this enactment has eradicated an antiquated technicality behind
which the undisclosed principal could plead freedom from legal liability while reaping
the fruits of the agreement.2 7
20. REcomEa DATIOx or THE L w REVIsIOw Coansson To rmm Lwxro Lrs "na
,Legis. Doc. (1937) 65 (H).
21. The provisions of the statute relating to consideration and the modification of
sealed instruments have been ably treated in (1936) 5 FoaRnuH L. REv. 144; (1937) 37
Cor- L. REv. 674.
22. N. Y. Cmv. PRAC. Act (1937) § 47 reads: "An action upon a sealed instrument must
be commenced within 20 years after the cause of action has accrued.2'
23. Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. 54 (N. Y. 1832); Worrall v. Munn, S N. Y1 229
(1851); RESTATEaIENT, AGNqCz (1934) § 28.
24. See Freidus, A New Problem in Mortgage Practice, N. Y. L. J., July 6, 7, 1936
p. 50, 64, col 1; Fribourg, Does It Make For Complication? N. Y. Sun, Feb. 27, 1937,
p. 48, col. 1.
25. This statute will not change the related rule in N. Y. NrwoTnxzrm .n s-mnumrrs
LAw (1909) §§ 37-39 which excludes from liability a person whose name does not appear
on the instrument.
26. See Fribourg, supra note 24.
27. Henricus v. Englert, 137 N. Y. 488, 33 N. E. 560 (1893) (agent brought action
on bond under seal for the benefit of the undisclosed principal).
1937]
